Principal Doctrines
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English Translation |
Greek Original [note] |
| 1. |
That which is blissful and immortal has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for others, so that it is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness). [note] |
τὸ μακάÏιον καὶ ἄφθαÏτον οὔτε αá½Ï„ὸ Ï€Ïάγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παÏÎχει· ὥστε οὔτε á½€Ïγαῖς οὔτε χάÏισι συνÎχεται· á¼Î½ ἀσθενεῖ Î³á½°Ï Ï€á¾¶Î½ τὸ τοιοῦτον. |
| 2. |
Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us. [note] |
ὠθάνατος οá½Î´á½²Î½ Ï€Ïὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ Î³á½°Ï Î´Î¹Î±Î»Ï…Î¸á½²Î½ ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δʼἀναισθητοῦν οá½Î´á½²Î½ Ï€Ïὸς ἡμᾶς. |
| 3. |
The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress. [note] |
á½…Ïος τοῦ μεγÎθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίÏεσις. ὅπου δʼἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον á¼Î½á¿‡, καθʼὃν ἂν χÏόνον á¾–, ουκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν á¼¢ λυποÏμενον á¼¢ τὸ συναμφότεÏον. |
| 4. |
Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains. [note] |
οὠχÏονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς á¼Î½ τῇ σαÏκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκÏον τὸν á¼Î»Î¬Ï‡Î¹ÏƒÏ„ον χÏόνον πάÏεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπεÏτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάÏκα οὠπολλὰς ἡμÎÏας συμβαίνει· αἱ δὲ πολυχÏόνιοι τῶν á¼€ÏÏωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον á¼Î½ τῇ σαÏκὶ á¼¤Ï€ÎµÏ Ï„á½¸ ἀλγοῦν. |
| 5. |
It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously. [note] |
οá½Îº ἔστιν ἡδÎως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φÏονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <οá½Î´á½² φÏονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδÎως· ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάÏχει, οá½Ï‡ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδÎως ζῆν. |
| 6. |
It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage). [note] |
ἕνεκα τοῦ θαÏÏεῖν á¼Î¾ ανθÏώπων ἦν κατὰ φÏσιν á¼€Ïχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, á¼Î¾ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τʼᾖ παÏασκευάζεσθαι. |
| 7. |
Some people want to be well esteemed and widely admired, believing that in this way they will be safe from others; if the life of such people is secure then they have gained its natural benefit, but if not then they have not gained what they sought from the beginning in accordance with what is naturally appropriate. [note] |
ἔνδοξοι καὶ πεÏίβλεπτοί τινες á¼Î²Î¿Ï…λήθησαν γενÎσθαι, τὴν á¼Î¾ ἀνθÏώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες πεÏιποιήσεσθαι ὤστε, εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὠτῶν τοιοÏτων βίος, ἀπÎλαβον τὸ τῆς φÏσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλὴς, οá½Îº ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα á¼Î¾ á¼€Ïχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φÏσεως οἰκεῖον á½ ÏÎχθησαν. |
| 8. |
No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves. [note] |
οá½Î´ÎµÎ¼Î¯Î± ἡδονὴ καθʼἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους á¼Ï€Î¹Ï†ÎÏει τὰς οχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν. |
| 9. |
If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one’s nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another. |
εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονὴ Ï„<όπ>ῳ καὶ χÏόνῳ καὶ πεÏá½¶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθÏοισμα ὑπῆÏχεν á¼¢ τὰ κυÏιώτατα μÎÏη τῆς φÏσεως, οá½Îº ἄν ποτε διÎφεÏον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί. |
| 10. |
If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that’s what is bad). [note] |
εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν πεÏá½¶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τοÏÏ‚ τε πεÏá½¶ μετεώÏων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ Ï€ÎÏας τῶν á¼Ï€Î¹Î¸Ï…μιῶν <καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων> á¼Î´Î¯Î´Î±ÏƒÎºÎµÎ½, οá½Îº ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν á½… τι μεμψαίμεθα αá½Ï„οῖς πανταχόθεν á¼ÎºÏ€Î»Î·ÏουμÎνοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οá½Î´Î±Î¼ÏŒÎ¸ÎµÎ½ οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυποÏμενον ἔχουσιν, á½…Ï€ÎµÏ á¼ÏƒÏ„á½¶ τὸ κακόν. |
| 11. |
If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural. [note] |
εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώÏων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ πεÏá½¶ θανάτου, μήποτε Ï€Ïὸς ἡμᾶς á¾– τι, ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς á½…Ïους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν επιθυμιῶν, οá½Îº ἄν Ï€Ïοσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας. |
| 12. |
It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural. [note] |
οá½Îº ἦν τὸ φοβοÏμενον λÏειν á½‘Ï€á½²Ï Ï„á¿¶Î½ κυÏιωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σÏμπαντος φÏσις, ἀλλʼ ὑποπτεÏοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μÏθους· ὥστε οá½Îº ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεÏαίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν. |
| 13. |
It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below the earth and in general about the infinite unknown. [note] |
οá½Î¸á½²Î½ ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθÏώπους ἀσφάλειαν παÏασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ á¼Ï€Î»á¿¶Ï‚ τῶν á¼Î½ τῷ ἀπείÏῳ. |
| 14. |
Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fight them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd. [note] |
τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς á¼Î¾ ἀνθÏώπων γενομÎνης μÎχÏι τινὸς δυνάμει τε á¼Î¾ÎµÏειστικῇ καὶ εá½Ï€Î¿Ïίᾳ, εἰλικÏινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ á¼Îº τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ á¼ÎºÏ‡Ï‰Ïήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια. |
| 15. |
Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by groundless opinion have no end. [note] |
ὠτῆς φÏσεως πλοῦτος καὶ á½¥Ïισται καὶ εá½Ï€ÏŒÏιστός á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν, ὠδὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειÏον á¼ÎºÏ€Î¯Ï€Ï„ει. |
| 16. |
Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason. [note] |
βÏαχÎα σοφῷ Ï„Ïχη παÏεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μÎγιστα καὶ κυÏιώτατα ὠλογισμὸς διῴκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χÏόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει. |
| 17. |
One who acts aright is utterly steady and serene, whereas one who goes astray is full of trouble and confusion. [note] |
ὠδίκαιος ἀταÏακτότατος, ὠδʼ ἄδικος πλείστης ταÏαχῆς γήμων. |
| 18. |
As soon as the pain produced by the lack of something is removed, pleasure in the flesh is not increased but only embellished. Yet the limit of enjoyment in the mind is produced by reasoning out these very things and similar things, which once provoked the greatest fears in the mind. |
οá½Îº ἀπαÏξετι á¼Î½ τῇ σαÏκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, á¼Ï€ÎµÎ¹Î´á½°Î½ ἅπαξ τὸ κατʼ ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν á¼Î¾Î±Î¹Ïεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται. τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ Ï€ÎÏας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγÎννησεν á¼¥ τε τοÏτων αá½Ï„ῶν á¼ÎºÎ»ÏŒÎ³Î¹ÏƒÎ¹Ï‚ καὶ τῶν á½Î¼Î¿Î³ÎµÎ½á¿¶Î½ τοÏτοις, ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παÏεσκεÏαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ. |
| 19. |
Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning. [note] |
ὠἄπειÏος χÏόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὠπεπεÏασμÎνος, á¼Î¬Î½ τις αá½Ï„ῆς τὰ Ï€ÎÏατα καταμετÏήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ. |
| 20. |
The flesh assumes that the limits of joy are infinite, and that infinite joy can be produced only through infinite time. But the mind, reasoning out the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving fears about eternity, produces a complete way of life and therefore has no need of infinite time; yet the mind does not flee from joy, nor when events cause it to exit from life does it look back as if it has missed any aspect of the best life. |
ἡ μὲν σὰÏξ ἀπÎλαβε τὰ Ï€ÎÏατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειÏα καὶ ἄπειÏος αá½Ï„ὴν χÏόνος παÏεσκεÏασεν· ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαÏκὸς Ï„Îλους καὶ Ï€ÎÏατος λαβοῦσα τὸν á¼Ï€Î¹Î»Î¿Î³Î¹ÏƒÎ¼á½¸Î½ καὶ τοὺς á½‘Ï€á½²Ï Ï„Î¿á¿¦ αἰῶνος φόβους á¼ÎºÎ»Ïσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παÏεσκεÏασε, καὶ οá½Î¸á½²Î½ ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείÏου χÏόνου Ï€Ïοσεδεήθη· ἀλλʼ οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονὴν οá½Î´Ê¼ ἡνίκα τὴν á¼Î¾Î±Î³Ï‰Î³á½´Î½ á¼Îº τοῦ ζῆν τὰ Ï€Ïάγματα παÏεσκεÏαζεν, ὡς á¼Î»Î»ÎµÎ¯Ï€Î¿Ï…σά τι τοῦ á¼€Ïίστου βίου κατÎστÏεψεν. [note] |
| 21. |
One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and to make one’s entire life complete; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle. [note] |
ὠτὰ Ï€ÎÏατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὡς εá½Ï€ÏŒÏιστόν á¼ÏƒÏ„ι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατʼ ἔνδειαν á¼Î¾Î±Î¹Ïοῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν· ὥστε οá½Î´á½²Î½ Ï€Ïοσδεῖται Ï€Ïαγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημÎνων. |
| 22. |
You must reflect on the fundamental goal and everything that is clear, to which opinions are referred; if you do not, all will be full of trouble and confusion. [note] |
τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς δεῖ Ï„Îλος á¼Ï€Î¹Î»Î¿Î³Î¯Î¶ÎµÏƒÎ¸Î±Î¹ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν á¼Î½Î¬Ïγειαν, á¼Ï†Ê¼ ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντα ἀκÏισίας καὶ ταÏαχῆς ἔσται μεστά. |
| 23. |
If you fight against all your perceptions, you will have nothing to refer to in judging those which you declare to be false. [note] |
εἰ μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οá½Ï‡ ἕξεις οá½Î´Ê¼ ἃς ἂν φῇς αá½Ï„ῶν διεψεῦσθαι Ï€Ïὸς τί ποιοÏμενος τὴν ἀγωγὴν κÏίνῃς. |
| 24. |
If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, then you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct. |
εἰ τινʼ á¼ÎºÎ²Î±Î»Îµá¿–Ï‚ á¼Ï€Î»á¿¶Ï‚ αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιÏήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον καὶ τὸ Ï€ÏοσμÎνον καὶ τὸ παÏὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν á¼Ï€Î¹Î²Î¿Î»á½´Î½ τῆς διανοίας, συνταÏάξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κÏιτήÏιον ἅπαν á¼ÎºÎ²Î±Î»Îµá¿–ς· εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ Ï€ÏοσμÎνον ἅπαν á¼Î½ ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς á¼Î½Î½Î¿Î¯Î±Î¹Ï‚ καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν á¼Ï€Î¹Î¼Î±ÏÏ„ÏÏησιν <ἔχον>, οá½Îº á¼ÎºÎ»ÎµÎ¯ÏˆÎµÎ¹Ï‚ τὸ διεψευσμÎνον, ὡς τετηÏηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κÏίσιν τοῦ á½€Ïθῶς á¼¢ μὴ á½€Ïθῶς. |
| 25. |
If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony. |
εἰ μὴ παÏá½° πάντα καιÏὸν á¼Ï€Î±Î½Î¿Î¯ÏƒÎµÎ¹Ï‚ ἕκαστον τῶν Ï€ÏαττομÎνων á¼Ï€á½¶ τὸ Ï„Îλος τῆς φÏσεως, ἀλλὰ Ï€ÏοκαταστÏÎψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιοÏμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οá½Îº ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ Ï€Ïάξεις ἀκόλουθοι. |
| 26. |
The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm. [note] |
τῶν á¼Ï€Î¹Î¸Ï…μιῶν ὅσαι μὴ á¼Ï€Ê¼ ἀλγοῦν á¼Ï€Î±Î½Î¬Î³Î¿Ï…σιν á¼á½°Î½ μὴ συμπληÏῶσιν, οá½Îº εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλʼ εá½Î´Î¹Î¬Ï‡Ï…τον τὴν ὄÏεξιν ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δυσποÏίστων ἤ βλάβης ἀπεÏγαστικαὶ δόξωσιν εἶναι. |
| 27. |
Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one’s entire life, by far the greatest is friendship. [note] |
ὧν ἡ σοφία παÏασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαÏιότητα πολὺ μÎγιστόν á¼ÏƒÏ„ιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. |
| 28. |
The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship. |
ἡ αá½Ï„á½´ γνώμη θαÏÏεῖν τε á¼Ï€Î¿Î¯Î·ÏƒÎµÎ½ á½‘Ï€á½²Ï Ï„Î¿á¿¦ μηθὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν μηδὲ πολυχÏόνιον καὶ τὴν á¼Î½ αá½Ï„οῖς τοῖς ὡÏισμÎνοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κατεῖδε συντελουμÎνην. |
| 29. |
Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion). [note] |
τῶν á¼Ï€Î¹Î¸Ï…μιῶν αἱ μÎν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ <ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ> οá½Îº ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παÏá½° κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι. |
| 30. |
Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind. |
á¼Î½ αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν á¼Ï€Î¹Î¸Î¼Î¹á¿¶Î½ μὴ á¼Ï€Ê¼ ἀλγοῦν δὲ á¼Ï€Î±Î½Î±Î³Î¿Ï…σῶν á¼á½°Î½ μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν, ὑπάÏχει ἡ σπουδὴ σÏντονος, παÏá½° κενὴν δόξαν αὗται γίνονται, καὶ οὠπαÏá½° τὴν ἑαυτῶν φÏσιν οὠδιαχÎονται ἀλλὰ παÏá½° τὴν τοῦ ἀνθÏώπου κενοδοξίαν. |
| 31. |
Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed. [note] |
τὸ τῆς φÏσεως δίκαιόν á¼ÏƒÏ„ι σÏμβολον τοῦ συμφÎÏοντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. |
| 32. |
With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed. |
ὅσα τῶν ζῴων μὴ á¼Î´Ïνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς á½‘Ï€á½²Ï Ï„Î¿á¿¦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, Ï€Ïὸς ταῦτα οá½Î¸á½²Î½ ἦν δίκαιον οá½Î´á½² ἄδικον· ὡσαÏτως δὲ καὶ τῶν á¼Î¸Î½á¿¶Î½ ὅσα μὴ á¼Î´Ïνατο á¼¢ μὴ á¼Î²Î¿Ïλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς á½‘Ï€á½²Ï Ï„Î¿á¿¦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. |
| 33. |
Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed, which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place. [note] |
οá½Îº ἦν τι καθʼ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσÏνη, ἀλλʼ á¼Î½ ταῖς μετʼ ἀλλήλων συστÏοφαῖς καθʼ á½Ï€Î·Î»Î¯ÎºÎ¿Ï…Ï‚ δήποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις á½‘Ï€á½²Ï Ï„Î¿á¿¦ μὴ βλάπτειν á¼¢ βλάπτεσθαι. |
| 34. |
Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing. |
ἡ ἀδικία οὠκαθʼ ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλʼ á¼Î½ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς á½‘Ï€á½²Ï Ï„á¿¶Î½ τοιοÏτων á¼Ï†ÎµÏƒÏ„ηκότας κολαστάς. |
| 35. |
It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection. [note] |
οá½Îº ἔστι τὸν λάθÏα τι ποιοῦντα ὧν συνÎθεντο Ï€Ïὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι τιστεÏειν ὅτι λήσει, κἄν μυÏιάκις á¼Ï€á½¶ τοῦ παÏόντος λαθάνῃ· μÎχÏι Î³á½°Ï ÎºÎ±Ï„Î±ÏƒÏ„Ïοφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει. |
| 36. |
In general, justice is the same for all: what is mutually advantageous among companions. But with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for all. [note] |
κατὰ μὲν <τὸ> κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αá½Ï„ό· συμφÎÏον Î³Î¬Ï Ï„Î¹ ἦν á¼Î½ τῇ Ï€Ïὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώÏας καὶ ὅσων δήποτε αἰτίων οὠπᾶσι συνÎπεται τὸ αá½Ï„ὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. |
| 37. |
Among things that are thought to be just, that which has been witnessed to bring mutual advantage among companions has the nature of justice, whether or not it is the same for everyone. But if someone legislates something whose results are not in accord with what brings mutual advantage among companions, then it does not have the nature of justice. And if what brings advantage according to justice changes, but for some time fits our basic grasp of justice, then for that time it is just, at least to the person who is not confused by empty prattle but instead looks to the facts. [note] |
τὸ μὲν á¼Ï€Î¹Î¼Î±ÏτυÏοÏμενον ὅτι συμφÎÏει á¼Î½ ταῖς χÏείαις τῆς Ï€Ïὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθÎντων εἶναι δικαίων ἔχειν τοῦ δικαίου χώÏαν <δ>εῖ, á¼Î¬Î½ τε τὸ αá½Ï„ὸ πᾶσι γÎνηται á¼Î¬Î½ τε μὴ τὸ αá½Ï„ό· á¼á½°Î½ δὲ <νόμον> μόνον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφÎÏον τῆς Ï€Ïὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οá½ÎºÎτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δίκαιου φÏσιν ἔχει· κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφÎÏον, χÏόνον δΠτινα εἰς τὴν Ï€Ïόληψιν á¼Î½Î±Ïμόττῃ, οá½Î´á½²Î½ ἦττον á¼ÎºÎµá¿–νον τὸν χÏόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταÏάττουσιν ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ Ï€Ïάγματα βλÎπουσιν. |
| 38. |
When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just. [note] |
ἔνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομÎνων τῶν πεÏιεστώτων Ï€Ïαγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ á¼Ïμόττοντα εἰς τὴν Ï€Ïόληψιν τὰ νομισθÎντα δίκαια á¼Ï€Ê¼ αá½Ï„ῶν τῶν á¼”Ïων, οá½Îº ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια· ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομÎνων τῶν Ï€Ïαγμάτων οá½ÎºÎτι συνÎφεÏε τὰ αá½Ï„á½° δίκαια κείμενα, á¼Î½Ï„αῦθα δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια ὅτε σενÎφεÏεν εἰς τὴν Ï€Ïὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομÎνων, ὕστεÏον δʼ οá½Îº ἦν ἔτι δίκαια ὅτε μὴ συνÎφεÏεν. |
| 39. |
The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away anything that is not advantageous. |
á½ <τὰ ἑαυτοῦ Ï€Ïὸς> τὸ μὴ θαÏÏοῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄÏιστα συστησάμενος, οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ á½Î¼ÏŒÏ†Ï…λα κατεσκευάσατο, τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οá½Îº ἀλλόφυλά γε· ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμεικτος á¼Î³Îνετο καὶ á¼Î¾Î·Ïείσατο ὅσα <Ï€Ïὸς> τοῦτʼ á¼Î»Ï…σιτÎλει Ï€Ïάττειν. |
| 40. |
All those who have the power to obtain the greatest confidence from their neighbors also live with each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust; and experiencing the strongest fellowship they do not lament as pitiful the untimely end of those who pass away. [note] |
ὅσοι τὴν δÏναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαÏÏεῖν μάλιστα á¼Îº τῶν á½Î¼Î¿ÏÏοÏντων παÏασκευάσασθαι, οὗτοι καὶ á¼Î²Î¯Ï‰ÏƒÎ±Î½ μετʼ αλλήλων ἥδιστα τὸ βεβαιότατον πίστωμα ἔχοντες, καὶ πληÏεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες οá½Îº ὠδÏÏαντο ὡς Ï€Ïὸς ἔλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος Ï€ÏοκαταστÏοφήν. |
Translator’s Notes
[0] The English translation is provided under Creative Commons CC0 (for details, refer to the Publisher’s Note). The Greek text is in the public domain. The text provided here generally follows that of Hermann Usener as published in his Epicurea (1887), with some attention paid to the texts of G. Arrighetti as published in Epicuro Opere (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1960) and of A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley as published in Volume 2 of The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge University Press, 1987). [back]
[1] The phrase “that which is blissful and immortal” is a roundabout way of referring to the gods (see the Letter to Menoeceus, Section 123, in which Epicurus exhorts the reader to “believe that god is a blissful, immortal being”). The Greek word μάκαÏ, translated here as “blissful”, could also be translated as “blessed” (Fragments #138 and #469) or as “completely happy” (Principal Doctrine #27). The idea that a being at peace with itself does not cause trouble for others also appears in Vatican Sayings #79. (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #1.) [back]
[2] The phrase “what has disintegrated” is a reference to a living being that has died. (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #2.) [back]
[3] The word ἡδονή is often translated solely as “pleasure”; however, depending on the context I also translate it as “delight”, “joy”, or “enjoyment” because the Greek word ἡδονή refers to any physical, emotional, or mental state that is filled with sweetness (ἡδÏÏ‚), whereas the English word “pleasure” carries stronger connotations of a purely physical state (although compare phrases such as “the pleasures of philosophy”). Furthermore, although there is no hard and fast distinction between ἄλγος as bodily pain and λυποÏμενος as mental distress, the former word tends to be used more in relation to the body and the latter more in relation to the mind or emotions; see also Principal Doctrine #10. For other texts that emphasize the concept of a natural limit to enjoyment, see Principal Doctrines #11, #15, #18, #19, #20, as well as Letter to Menoeceus, Section 133, Vatican Saying #35, and Fragment #548. [back]
[4] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #3.) [back]
[5] The word φÏονίμως, translated here as “wisely”, derives from the word for practical wisdom (see also Letter to Menoeceus, Section 132); although it is often translated as “prudently”, that word is no longer commonly used in current English and to the modern ear sounds positively Victorian, which is why I have opted to translate φÏονίμως as “wisely”. The word καλῶς, translated here as “beautifully”, has many meanings, including “nobly” and “honorably”; however, the root meaning of καλός is beauty in either the aesthetic or the ethical sense. On the word δικαίως as “rightly” instead of “justly”, see the note to Principal Doctrine #17. It is not clear what “this” refers to in the phrase “whoever lacks this cannot live joyously”; I take the phrase to mean that one cannot live joyously if one lacks the integration or harmony of wisdom, beauty, and rightness. (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #5 and appears almost verbatim at Letter to Menoeceus, Section 132.) [back]
[6] The phrase “taking courage” translates the verb θαÏÏεῖν, which is derived from the word for courage, daring, boldness, or confidence. The basic Epicurean sense I find in this paragraph is “if you were the king or a leader of men, you would take courage from the support of the men under your command (at least to the extent that they are the sort of men who can give you courage), and taking courage in that way would be a natural good for you but for the rest of us, we must take courage not from our followers but from ourselves and from our friends.” [back]
[7] As a contrast to the false sense of security engendered by being well esteemed and widely admired, see among other passages Principal Doctrines #14, #28, and 39, where Epicurus discusses more reliable foundations for safety and security, such as self-reliance, friendship, and living in accordance with reason. [back]
[8] Similar sentiments can be found at, for example, Letter to Menoeceus, Section 129 (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #50.) [back]
[10] Epicurus also mentions the pleasures or delights of decadent people at Letter to Menoeceus, Section 131. [back]
[11] I translate the word φυσιολογία as “the study of what is natural”; see the note to Vatican Sayings #29. [back]
[12] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #49.) [back]
[13] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #72.) [back]
[14] The word ἡσυχία, translated here as “solitude”, can also mean “quietude” or “stillness” (translations that would also be quite consistent with the philosophy of Epicurus). The phrase “breaking away from the herd” is my attempt to render the Greek phrase á¼ÎºÏ‡Ï‰Ïήσεως τῶν πολλῶν, which means literally “departing from the many” (οἱ πολλοί are “the masses” a phrase so useful it has been transliterated directly in English as “hoi polloi”). Note also that although the received text reads á¼ÎºÏ‡Ï‰Ïήσεως (“departing”), the Greek word á¼ÎºÏ‡Î¿Ïήσεως means “stepping out from the chorus” and thus draws a vivid contrast between the vibrant leading characters and the stolid mass of citizens in ancient Greek tragedies; scribal error could account for a change from omicron to omega in the fourth character of the word, especially because á¼ÎºÏ‡Î¿Ïήσεως is much less common than á¼ÎºÏ‡Ï‰Ïήσεως. [back]
[15] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #8.) [back]
[16] The contrast between chance or fate and reason or choice is explored in greater depth at Letter to Menoeceus, Section 133 and following. [back]
[17] I have expanded the translation here to capture several meanings of the key terms: ἀταÏακτότατος means “utterly without disturbance” and by extension steady or serene, whereas πλείστης ταÏαχῆς means full of trouble, disorder, or tumult (expanded here to “full of trouble and confusion”; see also Principal Doctrine #22 and the note thereto). The words ὠδίκαιος and ὠἄδικος are often translated “the just man” and “the unjust man”, but the modern concept of justice is almost purely social whereas the Greek word δίκαιος has a wider range of meaning that encompasses what is right, fitting, balanced, ordered, decent, civilized, etc.; I have attempted to capture this ambiguity through the phrases “one who acts aright” and “one who goes astray”. (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #12.) [back]
[19] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #22.) [back]
[20] In the Greek, this paragraph is written in the past tense. Because it is confusing to read that way, I have rendered it in the present tense. [back]
[21] The word ἀγών, translated here as “struggle”, originally referred to the contests pursued by athletes at public festivals such as the Olympic games; Epicurus is not necessarily counselling against personal discipline (such as that involved in learning true philosophy), but against the trials and dangers of action in the public arena. [back]
[22] Here the translated phrase “trouble and confusion” reflects the Greek words ἀκÏισία (literally “indistinctness”) and ταÏαχή (literally “trouble”, “disorder”, or “tumult”); see also Principal Doctrine #17 and the note thereto. [back]
[23] This paragraph reflects the Epicurean doctrine that all perceptions are true. [back]
[26] For related insights, see Letter to Menoeceus, Section 127 and following, Principal Doctrines #21 and #30, as well as Vatican Saying #21. [back]
[27] The concept of μακαÏία, translated here as “complete happiness”, is also referenced in Principal Doctrine #1 when Epicurus speaks of the gods. In Vatican Saying #78, Epicurus says that friendship is an immortal good whereas wisdom is a mortal good; it is unclear if the other things that wisdom provides for complete happiness are also immortal goods. (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #13.) [back]
[29] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #20.) [back]
[31] The word σÏμβολον refers to a covenant, contract, or other mutual agreement, especially (in a legal sense) a treaty between two city-states to safeguard trading between them. The verb βλάπτω means to hurt or damage someone or something, but not in a way that reflects willful injustice or wrongdoing (for which the verb ἀδικÎω is used). [back]
[33] The word συνθήκη, translated here as “compact”, means essentially the same as the word σÏμβολον from Principal Doctrine #31. [back]
[35] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #6.) [back]
[36] The word κοινωνία means a fellowship, an association, a partnership, a community; I have chosen to translate συμφÎÏον á¼Î½ τῇ Ï€Ïὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ as “what is mutually advantageous among companions” to emphasize the sense of a shared venture that is implicit in the Greek verb κοινωνÎω. [back]
[37] The Greek phrase τιθÎναι νόμον means to make legislation; here Epicurus contrasts man-made legislation with natural justice, which in somewhat old-fashioned English we might call natural law. The word Ï€Ïόληψις has a special meaning in the philosophy of Epicurus: it is the basic grasp that one has of a concept. For other instances, see Principal Doctrine #38 and Letter to Menoeceus, Section 124. [back]
[39] For related thoughts, see Letter to Menoeceus, Section 133 and following. [back]
[40] Somewhat reluctantly, I have translated the word οἰκειότης (from the Greek word for household) as “fellowship”. I say reluctantly because my preferred translation is the obsolete English word “frith”, which referred to the bonds of mutual loyalty and trust between family members, kinsmen, and friends, as well as the resulting feeling of mutual security (see <http://www.friggasweb.org/frith.html>). Unfortunately, the word “frith” has passed out of common usage and therefore is not appropriate for a modern translation of Epicurus (although the concept it identifies deserves to be resurrected). Other alternatives might include “intimacy”, “kindliness”, “friendly relations”, “friendliness”, “sense of community”, even “sense of belonging”. [back]
Publisher’s Note
The Greek text provided here is in the public domain.
The translator has provided the following statement regarding the copyright of his translation:
I, Peter Saint-Andre, made this translation of the Principal Doctrines of Epicurus from Greek into English in the year 2008. By licensing this translation under Creative Commons CC0, I hereby release all legal and economic rights to this translation under all jurisdictions (including but not limited to the rights to copy, republish, translate, arrange, modify, and make derivative works from this translation), and I grant anyone the right to use this translation without conditions for any purpose. My intent is that this translation shall be free from all claims of copyright and therefore shall pass directly into the public domain.
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by Epicurus (ἘπίκουÏος), trans. Peter Saint-Andre (2008).