by Arthur Schopenhauer Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must entirely fail of its aim. It is absurd to look upon the enormous amount of pain that abounds everywhere in the world, and originates in needs and necessities inseparable from life itself, as serving no purpose at all and the result of mere chance. Each separate misfortune, as it comes, seems, no doubt, to be something exceptional; but misfortune in general is the rule. I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems of philosophy in declaring evil to be negative […]
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When we entertain therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not […]
Socrates Come then, what is “taking pains over oneself” — 128a for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are — and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things? Alcibiades I at least believe so. Socrates Well now, [hide]when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet? Alcibiades I do not understand. Socrates Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand? For instance, […]
Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, 124b “Know thyself”; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save only pains and skill. [hide]If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamored than anyone else ever was of anything. Alcibiades Well then, what are the pains that I must take, Socrates? Can you enlighten me? For I must say […]
[hide]Alcibiades But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you. Socrates Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And the same man may well persuade one person singly, 114c and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And […]
[hide]Alcibiades I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right. Socrates What then? Granting that the just and the expedient 113e […]
Alcibiades But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way? Socrates Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it. Alcibiades But do you not think I might discover it? Socrates Yes, quite so, if you inquired. Alcibiades And do you not think I might inquire? Socrates I do, if you thought you did not know. Alcibiades And was there not a time when I held that view? Socrates Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was 110a that you thought you did not know […]
Socrates Now then: you intend, as I say, to come forward as adviser to the Athenians in no great space of time; well, suppose I were to take hold of you as you were about to ascend the platform, and were to ask you: “Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that should ? Is it something ?” What would be your reply? 106d Alcibiades I should say, I suppose, it was something about which I knew better than they. Socrates Then you are a good adviser on things about which you actually know. Alcibiades To […]
We should reflect that there is much reason to hope for a good result on other grounds as well. one of two things. it is the dead have no consciousness of anything, or, as we are told, it is really a change — a migration of the soul from this place to another. Now if there is no consciousness but , death must be a marvelous gain. I suppose that if anyone were told to pick out the night on which he slept so soundly as not even to dream, and then to compare it with all the other nights […]
I should very much like to say a few words to reconcile you to the result, while the officials are busy and I am not yet on my way to the place where I must die. I ask you, gentlemen, to spare me these few moments. There is no reason why we should not exchange fancies while the law permits. I look upon you as my friends, and I want you to understand the right way of regarding my present position. Gentlemen of the jury — for you deserve to be so called — I have had a remarkable experience. […]
35e There are a great many reasons, gentlemen, why this result — I mean — but the chief reason is that the result was not unexpected. but now it seems that if a mere thirty votes had gone the other way, I should have been acquitted. Even as it is, I feel that so far as Meletus’ part is concerned I have been acquitted, and not only that, but anyone can see that if Anytus and Lycon had not come forward to accuse me, would actually have forfeited his one thousand drachmas for not having obtained one fifth of the […]
— high-principled and patriotic as he claims to be — and after that against the rest. first again, as though it represented a fresh prosecution. Such is the charge. Let us examine its points one by one. First it says that I am guilty of corrupting the young. But I say, gentlemen, that Meletus is guilty of treating a serious matter with levity, since he summons people to stand their trial on frivolous grounds, and professes concern and keen anxiety in matters about which he has never had the slightest interest. I will try to prove this to your satisfaction. […]
After puzzling about it for some time, I set myself at last with considerable reluctance to check the truth of it in the following way. and pointing out to my divine authority, You said that I was the wisest of men, but here is a man who is wiser than I am. this person — I need not mention his name, but it was that I was studying when I had this experience — At any rate it seems that I am wiser than he is to this small extent, that I do not think that I know what I […]
[hide][/hide]103a Socrates Son of Cleinias, [hide]I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation[/hide] I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition, 1 of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, 103b so I have accordingly come to you; and I […]
I was especially astonished at one of their many misrepresentations; I mean when they told you that you must be careful not to let me deceive you — the implication being that I am a skillful speaker. I thought that it was peculiarly brazen of them to tell you this without a blush, since they must know that they will soon be effectively confuted, when it becomes obvious that I have not the slightest skill as a speaker — unless, of course, by a skillful speaker they mean one who speaks the truth. If that is what they mean, I […]
Socrates’ interrogations lead to a condition the Greeks called ‘aporia‘ (literally translated, ‘perplexity’, ‘impasse’, ‘puzzlement’). Socrates himself refers to it as “the torpedo” and claims its “shock” is “of advantage,” intellectually speaking. But its tendency in the larger process is not only destructive. In Plato’s Meno, Socrates says of his befuddled young interlocutor that far from being harmed by the ignorance that resulted from our “causing him to doubt and giving him the torpedo’s shock,” he is “better off” for it: At first he did not know what [he thought he knew], and he does not know even now: but […]
Not every account of philosophy gives such prominence to values and the dimension of personal meaning. It is true that some modern philosophers consider their work to be primarily technical and analytical, without any necessary connection to the personal. Some of these thinkers say the philosopher’s job is primarily the clarification of concepts; or the evaluation of views and the evidence for them; or the unconvering of hidden meanings, or untying of intellectual knots, whether by appeal to logic and analysis or to ordinary language. There is certainly merit to these accounts, even if they are incomplete. At times, they […]
Socrates was put to death for philosophizing. Of course, his style might have had something to do with it, too. In our reading of The Apology, we’ll encounter something of the flavor of the man. Here, I’ll introduce some ideas about Socrates’ role in shaping a conception of philosophy, which through his life takes a distinctive turn and receives a permanent coloring. Socrates carried out his philosophical mission by means of open-ended discussion or dialogue, modeling a practice involving others not by happenstance, but essentially: for Socrates, philosophy implies community, critical scrutiny and equality. Anyone might contribute key insights, and […]
“What is philosophy?” Rather than starting with a formal definition, I propose we pay attention to what philosophers do and how they do it. This will sooner lead us to deeper insight into what they’re up to. So that’s the plan. We’ll start by getting to know someone doing philosophy — and that someone is Socrates. Then we’ll trace his influence through a couple more philosophers — his disciple Plato; and, in turn, Plato’s student, Aristotle. Tracing this line will provide a sense of how philosophic themes morph or change over generations, even while remaining recognizably similar. But some would […]